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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16526 
IRA HATCH, et al . 
Defendants-Appellants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
* * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain commenced by the Utah 
Department of Transportation. The State seeks to condemn certain 
outdoor advertising signs owned by the appellants pursuant to the 
Utah Highway Beautification Act, §27-12-136.1, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent, the Utah Department of Transportation, moved for 
an order of Immediate Occupancy pursuant to the provisions of 
§78-34-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. The lower court 
granted respondent's Motion for Immediate Occupancy, finding that 
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the right of eminent domain carried with it the right of im-
mediate occupancy. 
Appellants petitioned this Court for an order granting an 
intermediate appeal pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which was granted by this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have this court reverse the trial court's 
order granting Immediate Occupancy on the grounds that the trial 
court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by 
failing to properly apply the statutory standard to respondent's 
Motion for Immediate Occupancy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1967, the State of Utah passed the Utah Highway Beautifi-
cation Act. The Act is codified in Section 27-12-136.1 et seg., 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. Since that time there have 
been periodic amendments. The Act was passed by the Utah State 
legislature in response to the Federal Highway Beautification 
Act, often referred to as the Ladybird Johnson Act, the purpose 
of which was to regulate and control outdoor advertising along 
federally financed highways. The federal government in the 
Federal Highway Beautification Act required each state to enact 
by statute or by rules and regulations sufficient authority to 
"effectively control outdoor advertising" or suffer a 10% penalty 
on all federal highway funds. In the event that control necessi-
tated acquisition by means of eminent domain, the federal govern-
ment would pay 75 percent of the condemnation award and the state 
would fund 25 percent. 
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The Utah Highway Beautification Act does not prohibit the 
ma 1 ntenance or erection of outdoor advertising signs but merely 
controls their location, size, and spacing. Upon passage of the 
utah Outdoor Advertising Act certain outdoor advertising signs 
became nonconforming due to their location, size, or spacing. 
For example, signs were not allowed in residential and agricultural 
areas. These signs then became nonconforming and subject to 
removal. However, outdoor advertising signs are allowed in 
certa1n commercial areas; areas which are otherwise unzoned but 
have actual commercial usage; and in other areas zoned for out-
door advertising and related highway uses. The Act provides that 
nonconforming signs are to be removed by eminent domain. In the 
12 years that this Act has been in existence, the State of Utah 
has removed, by eminent domain, contract, purchase, or gift, 
approximately 80 percent of the outdoor advertising structures 
which are nonconforming under the Act and subject to removal 
pursuant to the control provisions of the Act. 
On the 7th day of June, 1978, the State of Utah commenced 
condemnat1on proceedings against the appellants. Yet it wasn't 
unt1l the llth day of December, 1978, that the State filed its 
motion for immediate occupancy, which was subsequently ruled upon 
by Judge Christofferson on May 23, 1979. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
AS TO THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR 
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
Appellants' interlocutory appeal was predicated upon the 
premise that the lower court's order granting immediate occupancy 
was incorrect as a matter of law and an abuse of discretion and 
should therefore be reversed. 
In the absence of an express statutory provision, a condemnor 
may only take possession of the condemnee's property after a full 
trial on the merits of the condemnation and the resulting damage. 
Some states have enacted provisions for immediate occupancy or 
"quick-take" which may be granted in appropriate circumstances. 
Because of the nature of this action, in derogation of the rights 
of private citizens, these statutes are strictly construed. 
(See, ~, Department of Public Works v. Vogt, 366 N.E.2d 310 
(Ill. 1977) and Town of Messena v. Niagra Mohawk Power Co., 383 
N.Y. Supp. 2d 834 (N.Y. 1976).) The purpose of these "quick-
take" statutes is to provide for immediate possession when delay 
would have adverse effects upon the condemnor such as.increased 
costs and contractu~! obligations. (Vogt, supra.) 
In Utah, the statute authorizing immediate occupancy, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-34-9 reads in pertinent part: 
The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by 
affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises 
S?ught to be condemned and of the damages which 
w1ll accrue from the condemnation and of the rea=ons 
-4-
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for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall 
grant or refuse the motion accord1ng to the 
e~1ty of the case and the relat1ve damages 
wh1ch may accrue to the part1es. (emphas1s supplied). 
The lower court erred in granting respondent's Motion in that 
we court, in its Memorandum Decision, failed to weigh the equities 
and reasons for immediacy required by statute when it granted the 
state's motion. The Order of the Court reads in its entirety: 
The Court having reviewed the memoranda in 
these matters and also the transcript in the 
Davis County case of Utah Department of 
Transportation, plaintiff v. Grant Lloyd, 
defendan~. The Court finds there is a right 
to condemn and with it the right for immediate 
occupancy. The Court, therefore, grants the 
requests for orders of immediate occupancy to 
Utah Department of Transportation in all four 
cases. 
That ruling is improper in light of the requisites of §78-
34-9 which require proof of necessity for immediacy. The State 
presented no proof of necessity for occupation and no proof of 
damage if the order were denied while appellants submitted 
affidavits of damage if the order were granted. Simply because 
the condemning party has authority to condemn does not, ipso 
facto, give it the right of immediate occupancy without a further 
offering of proof of necessity for immediacy and resultant 
damages. 
In addition, the State made no showing of any need for 
speedy occupation or of any pecuniary or other damages which 
would result from delay, nor indeed any showing at all of need 
beyond the purposes of the challenged statute. 
-5-
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Appellants' will, by immediate occupancy, suffer immediate 
damage to their property and to their motels, which depend on 
travelers attracted by the signs for a large share of their 
business. (See Appellants' Affidavits). 
Thus, while traditionally the discretion of the lower court 
in these matters must be given some weight, in this case the 
court totally abused its discretion by rejecting all of the 
evidence submitted by the appellants and accepted the State's 
premise, offered without proof or authority, that it is entitled 
to immediate occupancy whenever it wants. 
The Court not only failed to weigh the relative damage to 
the parties, it didn't even consider them. The Court also 
failed to inquire into the reasons for immediacy as required by 
statute. 
Therefore, regardless of whether or not the State is entitl~ 
to immediate occupancy or even to condemn, the lower court's 
decision is improper and inadequate when measured up to the 
standards of proof required by the statute. 
II. 
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY IS AN IMPROPER MEASURE 
IN THIS MATTER AND WILL RESULT IN IRREPAR-
ABLE INJURY TO APPELLANTS 
For purposes of this action, appellants admitted that the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act and more specifically §27-
12-136.11(1), Utah Code Ann., appeared to grant to the Department 
of Transportation the power to condemn and eliminate outdoor 
advertising by means of eminent domain. Appellants do not concede 
-6-
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that this power is being lawfully exercised. However, respondent 
would have this Court believe that the question stops there and 
that the State may condemn at will. The power of eminent domain, 
however, is a creature of statute and its use must be compatible 
with its statutory source. 
Compliance with the statute is even more important where the 
state would condemn property under a quick-taking statute. This 
is true because the constitutional rights of the property owner 
are more ea3ily made secondary in the State's haste to acquire 
the property. Additionally, considerable damage would be suffered 
by a property owner during the interim period from the time when 
the State condemns prematurely to the time when the property 
owner may eventually prove that the taking is wrongful and unlaw-
ful. 
In this regard Utah law has provided certain safeguards 
under its quick-taking statute, §78-34-9, Utah Code Ann. That 
statute reads in pertinent part: 
The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by 
affidavit or otherwise of the value of the 
premises sought to be condemned and of the 
damages which will accrue from the condemnation, 
and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occu-
pation, and shall grant or refuse the motion 
according to the equity of the case and the 
relative damages which may accrue to the parties. 
Appellants do not contend that the Department of Transportation 
failed to provide the Court with proof of its evaluation of the 
property value as of the date of condemnation. Appellants are 
certain, however, that respondent did not and cannot prevail upon 
-7-
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the showing of necessity for speedy occupation nor upon the equi-
ties of the case and relative damages. 
A. There is no Pressing Need to Justify 
Immediat~ Occupancy. 
The quick-taking provisions are not merely a bonus remedy 
which the legislature grants to the condemning authority. They 
serve a particular and definite purpose. That purpose has been 
stated succinctly at 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §220(2) p.966: 
The declaration of taking is collateral, provisional, 
and supplemental to the condemnation proceedings, 
and its purpose is to provide a summary method for 
acquiring by the condemnor the title to and use 
of, the lands on short notice in order that 
public projects might be expedited and at the same 
time preserve to the owner all the protection of 
due process and to assure him just compensation. 
In Department of Public Works v. Vogt, 366 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 
1977) the Court there held that a "quick take" or immediate occu-
pancy is designed to be utilized only to "avoid delay in needed 
construction projects." 
In one Utah case which was brought under Comp. Laws Utah 
1919, §7339, the quick-taking predecessor statute, this Court held 
that a mining company with eminent domain power made a showing of 
need for immediate taking. The company had condemned rights of 
way and easements over the defendant's mining claim in order to 
excavate a tunnel and lay pipeline to collect copper bearing 
waters precipitating through plaintiff's overburden which was 
laying on defendant's mining claims. A showing was made that ~e 
copper bearing waters would produce annual net profits of Twelve 
Thousand to Fourteen Thousand Dollars and that without the pipeline 
-8-
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that water would be lost and the copper therefrom not recoverable. 
see Utah Copper Company v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining 
~mpany, 69 Utah 423, 255 P. 672 (1926). The need for immediacy 
was evident in the case. 
There is probably little argument from property owners whose 
land is condemned under the quick-taking provision of Utah law 
when construction of a freeway or dam or some other public project 
is imminent. Frequently in those cases the State has made contracts 
with construction companies so that the State becomes liable for 
penalties where the State causes delays. The State may also want 
to move quickly on a project so as to avoid rising costs of con-
struction. In order to avoid these secondary effects the State 
must expedite condemnation of the necessary parcels of land. In 
such circumstances, the State no doubt can make a clear showing of 
an immediate necessity for the land. No such showing can be made 
by the State in the instant matter, and indeed the State has not 
even attempted such a futile task in its memoranda to the lower 
Court. Here respondent is under no contractual obligations with 
any kind of private companies which would impose a penalty on the 
state were it unable to obtain land by condemnation by a specific 
date. Respondent faces no increased construction costs, because 
no construction is planned. This fact also negates any argument 
by respondent that appellants' outdoor signs impede some construc-
tion project. 
The State may also be concerned about inflation and the 
r1sing cost of real estate. Such concern may prompt the State to 
-9-
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~ct in condemnation matters with all expediency. This concern 15 
of no moment in the instant matter since a summons has been sened 
in the matter and, under authority of §78-34-ll, Utah Code Ann., 
damages are assessed as of the date of service of the summons. 
Respondent cannot show a pressing need for the reason that inflabc: 
may cause damages to amass in the interim. 
It is true that the U.S. Government will penalize, under 
authority of 23 U.S.C. §131, the Highway Beautification Act of 
1965, states which do not pass laws to control outdoor advertising 
Since this state has made provisions for control of outdoor a~e~ 
tising signs, Utah is not threatened by the Federal Highway 
Administrator with a reduction in Federal Revenue Sharing. Furthe:·' 
more, the Federal Regulations specifically state that signs are 
not to be removed 1mmediately: 
(3) Where it would not interfere with the 
State's operations, the State should 
program sign removal projects to minimize 
disruption of bus1ness. (23 CFR §750.304). 
Finally, there is nothing in the Federal regulations that 
require an immediate taking, on the contrary the federal act 
merely provides that the state provide legislation which regulateo 
outdoor advertising and that the federal government will provide 
75 percent of the compensation when the sign is removed. 
Respondent has chosen to ignore more than two hundred and 
fifty (250) other nonconforming signs throughout the State. (See 
affidavit of Raymond Paschke. ) This itself would seem to indicate 
that there really is no need to hurry with condemnation of the 
-10-
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outdoor advertising signs in the State of Utah. It especially 
strengthens the contention that condemnation of appellants' par-
ticular road signs will not aid the State in achieving some 
pressing goal that requires immediate removal. 
Additionally, the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act became law in 
this state in 1967. The State certainly has felt no immediate 
need up to the present to condemn road signs, a fact which stands 
as an insurmountable obstacle to any contention which respondent 
might now fabricate as to the need for immediate occupancy. The 
act itself at §27-12-136.10 granted a moratorium on removal of 
nonconforming road signs for a period of five years until December 
31, 1972. Clearly the Act recognized that the State was not 
under any obligation to meet a specific deadline with regard to 
removal of nonconforming signs. 
The Act provides that no condemnation of road signs can take 
place unless there are immediate funds available to pay the 
compensation required. (See §27-12-136.11.) This section, too, 
underlines the realization on the part of the legislature that 
condemnation would not take place by any specific date but could 
possibly be a gradual process as funds became available. 
Finally, respondent could advance no credible argument to 
the effect that the Wasatch Range has been made ugly by the 
existence of appellants' road signs and that the deadline for 
beautifying the wasatch Range is January, 1979. The Act itself 
does not set a timetable for the achievement of aesthetic beauty 
in the state of Utah, if indeed this Act would even achieve such 
a goal . 
-11-
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Furthermore, Section 27-12-136.5(2)(b)(iv), Utah Code Ann., 
1953 as amended, provides specifically that signs are not allowed 
in scenic areas "designated as such by the state highway depart-
ment or other state agency having and exercising such authority." 
This clearly exhibits a legislative intent that signs are not 
aesthetically unpleasant or degrading to the environment unless 
the Commission itself finds that the area is "scenic" in nature 
and therefore should be designated a scenic area. In that case, 
pursuant to statute and regulatory power, the State Department of 
Transportation has the authority to grant and order such an area 
to become a designated scenic area and signs are not allowed in 
such areas. Absent the declaration and finding by the Department 
of Transportat1on after a full public hearing, when competing 
interests may be heard, the signs are presumed, by the legislature 
and by statute, to be aesthetically proper. Accordingly, respon-
dent's theory that signs may be condemned without a declaration of 
a scenic area for aesthetic purposes is improper under the express 
wording of this section of the Utah Highway Beautification Act. 
This in and of itself distinguishes the Utah Beautification Act 
from other state statues and therefore makes such case authority 
upholding various state highway beautif1cation acts as irrelevant 
to the present matter. 
The purpose of quick-taking provisions is to expedite the 
construction of public projects so as to save the State increased 
cost because of penalty provisions in construction contracts or 
because of inflation. The value of property for purposes of 
-12-
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condemnation is determined as of the date the summons in the 
matter is served, so respondent in this case cannot claim harm in 
that regard if a premature occupancy is not allowed. Respondent 
faces no dangers of increased costs on a project nor does respon-
dent fact the danger of loss of federal revenues if an immediate 
taking is not granted. The State simply can show no reason why 
immediate occupancy is warranted in this case. Respondent there-
fore has not met its burden of proof which is required under the 
~ick-taking provisions. 
B. The Equities of the Case Weigh Heavily 
in Favor of a Denial of the Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy. 
A second requirement of the quick-taking provision of the 
condemnation statutes is that the court must weigh the equities 
between the parties to ascertain the relative damages. 
As pointed out above respondent will suffer no damage 
whatsoever if an immediate taking is not granted. The State has 
no timetable to meet which would justify immediate occupancy. 
On the other hand, appellants will suffer irreparable harm 
if the state is allowed to remove appellants' advertising signs. 
First of all, the physical components of the signs--lumber, 
metal, and paint--are expensive. Appellants' signs will be 
damaged in removal and storage, and possibly reinstallation. 
Secondly, these road signs are the only means of immediate 
information to the traveling public as to the location of appel-
lant's motels. Appellants will lose revenues from members of the 
traveling public who are unable to find the motel or who are 
-13-
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unaware of it because the State has been granted an order of 
immediate occupancy. Appellants depend to a great extent upon 
these road signs for a continuation of their businesses. (See 
affidavits of Appellants). In the event that the road signs are 
ultimately condemned and removed as a result of a ruling favor~le 
to the Department of Transportation in the main condemnation 
suit, appellants will be forced, at great expense of time and 
money, to find alternative means of informing the traveling 
public of the existence of their motels. The fact that this 
result may ultimately occur, however, should not work to the 
State's advantage in its attempt to condemn the road signs 
prematurely through the quick-taking procedure. Appellants 
should not be made to suffer hardship as a result of action by 
the State until it is absolutely clear that the State's doings 
are sanctioned by the law and this Court and then only after a 
proper showing at trial. 
One area of the law which requires a court to balance the 
equities between the parties is with regard to preliminary 
injunctions. The courts frequently use the "balance of hardship" 
test as defined in Ohio Oil Company v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815, 
49 s.ct. 256, 73 1. Ed. 972 (1929): 
Where the questions presented by an appli-
cation for an interlocutory injunction are 
grave, and the injury to the moving party will 
be certain and irreparable if the application 
be denied and the final decree be in his 
favor, while if the injunction be granted the 
injury to the opposing party, even if the 
final decree be in his favor, will be incon-
siderable, or may be adequately indemnified by 
a bond, the injunction usually will be granted. 
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If appellants had sought a preliminary injunction in this matter 
to prevent the State from proceeding with the condemnation of the 
outdoor advertising signs, the trial court would have been called 
upon to balance the equities of the case just as it is called upon 
now under §78-34-9, Utah Code Ann., the quick-taking provision. 
If the court were to apply the "balance of hardship" test, cited 
~ove, the court would see that appellants have presented grave 
~estions by their Answer as to the constitutionality of the Utah 
outdoor Advertising Act. The injury to appellants, if immediate 
occupancy is allowed, has been outlined above. And finally it has 
been shown that the State will suffer no injury by having to wait 
for a complete airing of the matter in a trial. 
Another principle in balancing the equities is that, where 
the preliminary injunction will have the effect of giving the 
movant what he ultimately seeks in the lawsuit, the court will not 
grant the preliminary injunction. Such a situation arose in 
Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., 548 P.2d 1 (Wyo., 1976). In that case 
the moving party sought a preliminary injunction to restrain 
defendants from inhibiting plaintiff's paving a 4-mile ranch road. 
Defendants claimed a violation of a surface damage agreement and 
advanced the argument that paving the road was injurious to their 
ranching operations. The trial court granted the preliminary 
injunction, but the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed on the principle 
lliat the injunction would allow the plaintiff to proceed with the 
Paving without the necessity of going to trial on the matter. 
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An analogous situation is presented in the instant matter. 
If the Department of Transportation is allowed to have immediate 
occupancy of appellants' outdoor advertising signs, then respondent 
will have achieved its ultimate goal in this lawsuit without 
having had to withstand the challenges set forth by appellants' 
Answer. Appellants meantime will be without their signs and will 
encounter great expense and loss of income if they ultimately 
triumph on the condemnation issue and are allowed to put their 
signs back up. It seems inherently unfair to allow the State the 
spoils of a conquest without requiring it to garner the victory. 
The equities of this case weigh heavily in favor of appellants 
in that, if the order for immediate occupancy is affirmed appel-
lants will suffer irreparable damage. Whereas, on the other hand, 
if the order is reversed, respondent will suffer no injury whatso-
ever. 
I I I. 
AN ORDER FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY SHOULD NOT 
ISSUE ABSENT A THOROUGH DETERMINATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ACT. 
Appellants have raised a number of constitutional issues in 
their Answers to the condemnation complaint. These questions of 
law and fact can be properly decided by this Court only after 
appellants have been allowed to present evidence and to make a 
record in the matter. A hearing on a motion for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy simply is not the proper forum for these 
complex issues to be decided by the court. 
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For example, appellants have raised a due process challenge 
on the ground that aesthetic values may not be of sufficient 
weight to justify a taking for public use under the eminent 
domain statutes in the State of Utah. Despite the numerous 
cases cited by respondent in its memoranda in the trial court to 
the effect that aesthetic values will justify a taking of land 
for public use without violation of due process rights, the 
state of Utah has itself never so ruled. This Court should not 
now make a ruling to that effect until Appellants have had an 
opportunity to substantiate their defenses by means of thorough 
evidence presented at trial. 
The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act may also be unconstitutional 
as violative of the due process clause in that the law is over-
broad and not reasonable. There are no legislative findings or 
statements to the effect that natural scenic beauty is destroyed 
or impaired by outdoor advertising. There simply is no rational 
relation between a goal of protecting scenic beauty along inter-
state and primary highways in the State of Utah and this vast 
prohibition of billboards. There is no evidence on the record 
in this case that billboards hamper scenic enjoyment. If the 
state seeks to justify its actions on the ground that scenic 
beauty is impeded by the existence of billboards, then respondent 
will have to make a record to that effect at trial. 
Furthermore, appellants' road signs are informational in 
character. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provides for the 
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regulation of informational signs, but it does not provide for 
their total prohibition. The actions of the State in seeking to 
eliminate appellants' informational road signs is highly arbi-
trary and violative of appellants' due process rights. Again 
appellants should have the chance to present evidence to the 
court as to compliance with the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act in 
this regard. 
Although respondent in its brief to the lower court cited 
many cases to the effect that Outdoor Advertising Acts in various 
states do not violate a sign owner's equal protection rights, 
nonetheless that has never been held to be the case in Utah. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that most of those cases 
which respondent cites are cases from eastern jurisdictions. 
Each act is different in each state. Respondent has not shown 
that the acts upheld in other jurisdictions are like the Utah 
law in pertinent respects. Each act must be examined in the 
context of the suit in which it was brought. 
Additionally the geographic and geophysical nature of the 
State of Utah is totally unique. Distinctions between signs 
located in commercial areas as opposed to those located in non-
commercial areas may not in fact be reasonable as a distinguish-
ing characteristic with regard to the State of Utah. Conse-
quently, respondent would not be able to demonstrate a rational 
basis for the Act in order to withstand a constitutional challen~· 
Here again it will be necessary to present these issues in their 
entirety to the court at trial. 
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More importantly, 1n this case there may be infringement of 
a fundamental right--the right to free speech. Here again 
respondent cited numerous cases to bolster a contention that 
outdoor advertising legislation is not an unreasonable restriction 
of time, place, and manner of commercial speech. But it must 
still be insisted upon that the State of Utah presents a unique 
situation with regard to media for communication and that appel-
lants' type of business also presents a unique situation with 
regard to dissemination of information about the ex1stence of 
his business. Recently a California Superior Court Judge held 
that the City of LaMesa had violated first amendment freedoms by 
its city ordinances restricitng outdoor advertising signs entirely 
from the most heavily traveled streets. The judge granted 
s~ary judgment to the defendant sign owners, holding: 
This much seems clear from the cases dealing with 
the subject: The control of a speech medium must 
be such as to permit the message to be delivered 
to those persons sought to be reached, and where 
a substantial portion of the target group is 
effectively screened from the message, the screen-
ing mechanism must be struck down. Since it 
seems clear that this ordinance will prevent the 
dissemination of messages to travelers now exposed 
to such messages in important areas of the city, 
the place and the manner of the regulation attemp-
ted is constitutionally overbroad. City of 
LaMesa v. Foster & Kleiser, Superior Court of 
Cal1forn1a, County of San Diego, No. 349300 
(decided May 31, 1977). 
In the instant matter removal of appellants' signs will also 
effectively screen an important message from a target group, i.e., 
the traveling public. 
-19-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellants have also defenses based on constitutional pro-
visions in the Utah Constitution and upon common law theories of 
estoppel. These defenses cannot be dismissed merely because llie 
State tells this Court there is no basis for these arguments. 
These arguments also must be dealt with at trial. 
Furthermore, pursuant to 23 U.S.C. Section 13l(o) of the 
Federal Highway Beautification Act, the Federal government specifl:· 
ally directed the state governments that they may exempt from 
condemnation certain tourist oriented signs whose removal would 
work a substantial economic hardship to the community. Appellants 
maintain that their signs would qualify under such exemption 
preventing their removal. Because of this directive, the State of 
Utah has failed to exhaust its administrative and legislative 
remedies before taking such a final act as condemnation. 
The act of condemning appellants' signs is the ultimate act 
which can be effected. There is no further and final act than 
taking someone' s property. It would seem abundantly clear to thJsl 
Court that in order for the State to take appellants' property,~ 
must exhaust all possible remedies short of condemnation prior to 
the taking of a private persons' property. One such example woulc 
be for the State either through administration procedures or 
legislative action to allow for an exemption, pursuant to the 
federal act. Clearly respondent has not exhausted its avail~le 
remedies and as such the present lawsuit before this Court is 
premature and should be dismissed on those grounds alone. 
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Utah case law very clearly shows that, where challenges are 
made to the right to condemn, a condemnor will not be granted an 
order of immediate occupancy. In State v. Denver & Rio Grande 
western Railroad Company, 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 926 (1958), this 
court upheld the trial court's denial of a motion for immediate 
occupancy where the State had sought to condemn 1.75 miles of a 
branch line operated by the railroad in order to construct a 
national highway. The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff's 
contention that without the order of immediate occupancy plans for 
construction of the highway would remain conjectural. The Court 
also recognized that in the ordinary condemnation case the granting 
of a motion for immediate occupancy is routine, since there is 
never any real question as to the state's power ultimately to 
condemn the property. The Court was faced with two entities which 
had equal power of condemnation, so that the question was one of 
"better use''. The Court concluded: 
[T]here would be little doubt but that the 
freeway as proposed would serve a higher and 
better use than does the branch line. However, 
defendant, having made an issue of this matter 
should be allowed to meet it with the adduction 
of any competent evidence it may choose to 
present at a regular trial. 332 P.2d at 927. 
Even where this Court was satisfied that the applicant for the 
order of immediate occupancy would ultimately prevail, nonetheless, 
since the case was not an ordinary condemnation suit because of the 
issue of better use and right to condemn had been raised by serious 
contentions in the pleadings, this Court held that the matter must 
go to trial and that an order of immediate occupancy was not appro-
Pilate. 
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In the instant matter this Court is faced with anything but 
the usual case for condemnation. As pointed out above this is not 
a case where the State is condemning property in order to build a 
road or construct a dam. Condemnation by the State for these t~es 
of construction projects have become so routine that no court is 
hesitant to grant an Order of Immediate Occupancy where the facts 
clearly indicate that the purpose for which the State is taking the 
property is an immediate and legitimate goal of the State. In the 
matter now before the Court the State is seeking to coTJdemn outdoor 
advertising signs by a statute which has never been tested in 
court. This is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction and ' 
the law of Utah is not settled. To proceed in a hasty manner and 
in contravention of State v. Denver & Rio Grande, supra, would be 
to deny appellants an opportunity to advance serious arguments to 
test the validity of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Department of Transportation made no showing of 
immediate need for condemnation of appellants' outdoor advertising ' 
signs. Quick-taking provisions are designed to allow the State to 
acquire land for which it has immediate need during a period when 
the question of compensation for the land is being litigated in 
court. Where serious questions as to the right to condemn the land~·, 
in the first instance are raised by the owner, Utah case law clearly 
I 
indicates that an Order for Immediate Occupancy is not appropriate. 
I 
I 
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Appellants raised serious questions as to the right of the 
state to condemn outdoor advertising signs under the Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act. The State will suffer no harm by having to wait 
until a final adjudication of all constitutional challenges is 
arrived at before it is allowed to occupy and remove the outdoor 
signs. Appellants on the other hand will suffer damages if the 
signs are removed immediately. 
For the foregoing reasons appellants respectfully request that 
this court reverse the Order of Immediate Occupancy granted .t:-·· the 
lower court. 
DATED this ~~~ay of November, 1979. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellants was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Robert B. Hansen and Stephen J. Sorenson, Attorney General's office, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this~ 
day of November, 1979. ~;I 
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